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LEGAL POSITIVISM AND AUTHORITARIANISM 
     IN JAPANESE LEGAL TRADITION t 
                  Mitsukuni YASAKI* 
               Judicial Logic 
                Thought on Legislation 
                The ChangingSocietyand The Policy 
                     of The Occupation Authority
                 How to Treat The Orders
                     at The New Stage?
                 Some Comparisonto TheGerman Case 
  It may perhaps sound ridiculous to say that civil liberty minded scholars 
hold an authoritarian view of law, or sociological jurists have a cryptical view of 
omnipotence of laws. It must be very contradictory. Our legal thinking, how-
ever, has been developed with the so much complexed context, partly due to the 
traditionally unbalanced evelopment of the socio-cultural conditions in Japan, 
that the apparently ridiculous matters have often been made possible here since 
approximately 1890, as I have partly described it in my preceding paper.' I In-
deed, the view of omnipotence of laws (in other words, the hard boiled legal 
positivism) combined with the authoritarianism has been still influencial, despite 
     f This is the second part of translation, though a bit modified inthe content, ofmy 
paper, "Hojisshoshugi" (Legal Positivism) in Japanese language, in: Series of Law in Con-
temporary World (Gendaiho-koza), Iwanamishoten, vol. 13. The first part of that paper was 
translated in this Osaka University Law Review, No. 14, 1966, entitled, "Legal Postivism in 
Japan". As to the legal positivism I have written a book and several papers inJapanese, by
changing aspects odeal with the subjects, asshown in the following Notes. At this time, 
the article is particularly concerned with legal thinking or attitude ofthis sort in Japan. 
     * Professor fGeneral Jurisprudence, Law Department, Osaka University. 
      1) Legal Positivism in Japan, Osaka University Law Review, No.14, 1966. As to 
its relation to this paper, see the Note above. In that paper, '66, I made an analysis on 
several technical terms used here, such as view of omnipotence of laws, hard boiled legal 
positivism, authoritarian view of law and socio-cultural t dition. See the paper, especially 
at p.18ff. and furthermore my book, Legal Positivism, written in Japanese, publ. by 
Nihonhyoronshinsha, 1963, (which gave abasis for analysis in that paper) p.216ff.
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of the remarkable appearance of the civil liberty minded and sociological juris-
prudence in modern Japan. Now we shall look at a few instances to show some 
dramatic scenary on this problem, which happened uring the short period of 
occupied Japan following the end of the Second World War. 
                       Judicial Logic 
  The most remarkable issue during this period is the Judgment of the Supreme 
Court, the Grand Bench (Daihotei) in 1948, which dealt with the case of violation 
of the "Order concerning the prohibition to hold firearms, etc."2) In dealing 
with this case, the Supreme Court was forced not only to review the Order itself, 
but even the Urgent Imperial Order (Kinkyu-Chokurei) No. 5423) underlying 
and validating the Order said above. To understand the background, the Urgent 
Imperial Order was the one which was at first promulgated under the Art. 8 of 
Meiji (older) Constitution on Sept. 20, 1945, and later approved by Imperial 
Diet on Dec. of the same year. The main problem is that it delegated to Cabinet 
Orders (Seirei) really a wide range of legal power to provide the matter of affairs, 
including punishments, a  never seen before. Why did it? There were surely the 
urgent necessities for Japanese Government on the one hand to promptly response 
and enforce the requisitions arising from the Occupation Authority authorized 
by the Potsdam Declaration and the surrending documents. By what means? 
The Orders were issued as most appropriate means for this purpose (We shall 
cite below those Orders, certainly including the Imperial Order, with the addi-
tion of the expression "Potsdam" to designate the conditions authorizing them). 
On the other, how to legally justify those Orders within the legal system4 ) in Japan 
differed between participants of different types. How it raised the great contro-
versy which in turn related to the topics of this paper, will be traced below. 
     2) Juho to shoji kinshirei. 
      3) The Urgent Imperial Order No. 542 says that "Government is eligible to issue 
Order provided with necessary p ovisions and punishments, especially in occasions to carry 
the matters into effect, arising from requisitions made by the Supreme Commander of Allied 
Powers, as a result of the acceptance of Potsdam Declaration". 
      4) As well known, the great changewasintroduced to Japan in regard to her legal 
and political systems after the end of the Second World War, 1945. Before, we had the (old) 
Meiji Constitution, "Imperial" Diet, and Great Court of Judicature (Daishinin), after, we 
have the New Constitution, Diet, and Supreme Court (Saiko Saibansho). But, the change 
from Japanese Empire to "Democratized" Japan-someone called it "August Revolution" 
-was certainly not made without great difficulties even in regard to its legal side, as to be 
shown below.
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  Turning to the starting point, let me cite a few paragraphs of that Judgment. 
"It is surely the very wide range of delegation of legislation which was admitted 
to the Orders by the Urgent Imperial Order. But, taking account of the facts 
that we are inevitably under the duty to sincerely realize and enforce the items 
of surrender which comes from the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration and 
sigature to the instrument of surrender, and that the prompt emforcement of
those items was desired and yet, it must excercise a far-reaching influence, there 
was no other course but the Urgent Imperial Order which provided a range of 
legislation delegated to the Order in regard to ` occasions especially necessary to 
carry the matters into effect, arising from requisitions made by the Supreme 
Commander of Allied Powers, as a result of the acceptance of the Potsdam 
Declaration.' Accordingly, we can't hold it as violating the conditions provided 
by the Art. 8 of Meiji Constitution." The delegation of legislation to the Order 
by the Urgent Imperial Order is also valid even under the New Constitution of 
Japan. "Since the sincere nforcement of the items of surrender was nothing but 
the performance of the legal duty imposed by the instrument of surrender, the 
delegation does not come to violate the relevant provison of New Constitutions)". 
As far as the Order at sake (concerning the prohibition to hold firearms, etc.) 
depends on the delegation above, it is also supposed to be valid, even though it 
includes provisions of punishment in question. 
  Merely following the Judgment ascited above, it may appear very succesful 
to persuade us how the validity of that prohibiting Order is syllogistically deduced 
from the major premises, the "Potsdam" Imperial Order. But, what gives us a 
strange feeling at first glance is the expression i  the Judgment "There was no 
other course but-." If we read frankly the first paragraph, it simply means 
that the wide range of the delegated legislation by the Potsdam Imperial Order 
is not against the conditions provided by the Art. 8 of Meiji Constitution. 
While doing it, however, the Judgment, by pointing out the urgent requisitions 
arising from the Occupying Authority, says that there was no other course but 
the Potsdam Imperial Order which delegated such and such. On the one hand, 
it says much in the way of justifying itself, such as "There was no other course 
but-." On the other, it assumes a defiant attitude, by speaking of no violation 
of the New Costitution. To sum up, what is now clear is that the Judgment alks 
in a roundabout way so that it puzzels us. Frankly speaking, it may perhaps be 
a proper idea of the Court that we can't help to delegate such a wide range of 
      5) Judgment of Supreme Court, June 23, 1948. A Collection ofCriminal Supreme 
Court Cases (Saiko Saibansho Keiji Hanreishu), vol. 2, No. 7, p.725f.
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legislation to the Order since the Supreme Commander requires o much at once. 
But, it does not always follow from this that the delegated legislation admitted 
in this way complies with the Constitution. While it is not always constitutional, 
the Court concludes itas constitutional. Isn't this a too much sophisticated way 
of reasoning? 
  Second, this is also the case with the latter paragraph cited above. Here, 
Prof. Jiro Tanaka (now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) found in this 
judicial reasoning a leap in logic as follows : The Judgment says that, since the 
Urgent Imperial Order is issued for the purpose of "performance of the legal 
duty imposed by the instrument of surrender", it complies with the New Con-
stitution, accordingly it is valid. But, it must be more reasonable to think that 
the Court can't objectively pass a judgment upon a constitutionality of each 
possible Orders, unless reviewing each of Orders in terms of each Articles of the 
New Constitution by the way of case by case. Without doing it, the Court holds 
generally the Urgent Imperial Order as valid. This is an extraordinary story, 
indeed. Besides, the more we think of the special character of the delegated 
legislation by the Urgent Imperial Order which is under suspicious circumstances 
for an unconstitutionality according to the New Constitution, as it gives a blank 
delegation of legal power of punishment, the more our impression must be deep-
ened. Thus, the following statement seems to be a correct answer to this ques-
tion. "Since the sincere nforcement of the items of surrender means the per-
formance of the legal duty imposed by the instrument of surrender, the validity 
of the Urgent Imperial Order as means for this purpose can't be changed even 
by those possibilities under which it may be against he provisions of the New 
Constitution-We can't help to think of this problem in this way with due regad 
to the position of our State in the international relations." 
  Considering the matter from this point of view, Prof. Tanaka continues to 
point out, the Urgent Imperial Order itself also comes to be unconstitutional, 
in so far as it includes uch a wide blank delegation of legal power on the one 
hand. On the other, however, he still admits its validity despite of its unconstitu-
titonality. Why is it possible to be valid at the same time while being unconstitu-
titonal? Because it "came from the supra-constitutional power", that is, the 
Authority of Allied Powers, and it "was issued as means to enforce the Author-
ity's requisitionsb )." In short, the Potsdam Imperial Order is surely held as 
justified, validated and legalized by the supra-constitutitonal power, but it does 
      6) JirO Tanaka, On the Potsdam, Urgent Imperial Order in regard to its unconstti-
tutionality, Koho Kenkyu, No. 1, 1949, p.77-9.
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not follow from this that the Order complied with the requirements of the New 
Constitutiton, consequently it is constitutitonal, valid and legal in terms of the 
New Constitutiton. Figuratively speaking, there were two levels of legal sys-
tems7) in Japan at that time. Its validity on the one level is not accompanied by 
its constitutionality on the other level, but by its unconstitutitonality. Whereas, 
the Judgment identifies the both levels. Here is a leap in the judicial logic. 
  As to how to think of this judicial logic, it reminds us at once the hard boiled 
legal positivism and the authoritarian view of law. In the very ground of the 
Supreme Court Judgment, we find both taking root, i.e., the authoritarianism 
saying that there was no other course to obey the Authority at that time, and the 
authoritarian view of law saying that the law is what the political power com-
mands us. Those are well to be said as a kind of the presupposition for the con-
ceptual (or mechanical) jurisprudence forthcoming, which, by viewing the law 
not only as a system, but as a logically (or mechanically) ordered closed system, 
hold its judicial conclusion as deduced from both, the major- and minor pre-
mises merely by logical reasoning. Indeed, this connected type of legal thinking 
and view, as well known, has often been called the hard boiled legal positivism 
or the view of omnipotence oflaws. To speak paradoxically, the Supreme Court 
Judgment as cited above suggests us the very crucial points for our subject 
matter. We are now to turn to the idea of the same sort, but in the different 
stage. This is the governmental idea in the Diet in connection with the legisla-
tive process of that Urgent Imperial Order. 
      7) It sounds unnatural tomention totwo levels of positive l gal systems a munici-
pal systems in Japan, let alone the international legal system on the one hand and the custom-
ary law living in social communities (such as like "living law" emphasized by late Prof. E. 
Ehrlich) on the other. Rather, lit would be more natural to assume one municipal legal 
system being valid there. It offers agood enough basis to Prof. Hans Kelsen for his idea of 
"Basic norm" for unifying vast fields of positive l gal rules, or to Prof. H. L. A. Hart for his 
idea of "Ultimate rule of recognition" for unifying them likely to Kelsen, but to be found 
in the practice of courts, officials and private persons (Hart, The concept oflaw, 1961, 
p. 107) unlikely to Kelsen. But, Japanese l gal system we are now analyzing makes an 
exception tothis ordinary system, like those which are also very exceptional due to Oc-
cupation ordeep dimension f change in their own social systems. So far, we may find here 
a fundamental jurisprudential question raised, as to how to find and treat "ultimate rule of 
recognition" (according to Prof. Hart) under such acircumstance, either in the side of practice 
oriented tothe Potsdam Orders, or to the New Constitution. As pointed out by Prof. Graham 
Hughes, it raises a serious problem which I will deal with in another paper (Hughes, 
Jurisprudence, in: Annual survey ofAmerican law, printed by New York University School 
of Law, 1966, p.649).
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                   Thought on Legislation 
  A Minister of State, Joji Matsumoto answerd as follows in the Meeting of the 
Special Commission, the Eighty Nineth Imperial Diet in 1945, where serious 
questions were raised on the character of that Order, No. 542. "This Urgent 
Imperial Order gives a wide range of delegation of legal power. But, there is 
no other course for us but this Order, because we are inevitably under the duty 
to carry into effect he Directives of the Commander of Allied Powers, in so far 
as we accepted the Potsdam Declaration."-"Genenrally speaking, I think, it is 
not always a proper way for the legislation. But, considering such an extraordin-
ary circumstance, I believe, there is no other course for us but this Order, and 
undoubtedly we can admit the Order as legal8 >." To compare his idea with the 
Judgment of the Supreme Court, one may perhaps be surprised to find the simil-
arity between here and there. For instance, his answer clearly explains the same 
idea, "there is no other course for us but this, such and such", prior to that Judg-
ment. This is also the case with his logic of its justification. Then, how about 
the word "legal"? First of all, it seems perhaps to properly indicate the Order's 
compliance with the Constitution. He himself, too, mentioned to this point. 
"This Urgent Imperial Order is issued on the ground of the Constitution for the 
purpose to carry into effect he Directives of the Headquarters9I." While the 
word "legal" is used under such a connotation, we are again faced with the other 
idea, "there is no other course for us but this-10>." If the Order was actually 
legal, there was no need to speak of "no other course but-." What is the basic 
way of thinking underlying his unstable state of mind? Likely to the Judgment 
above, one may well to find here the hard boiled legal positivism backed up by 
the authoritarian viewpoint, even though it be latent. 
    The Changing Society and The Policy of The Occupation Authority 
  We have examined the Judgment as well as the answer made by the judicial 
      8) Record of Committee's Meeting,-The Second Meeting, Dec. 13, 1945.I cited 
it from Tatsuo Sat(3's, "Apersonal note on the Potsdam Orders", No. 1, in: Jichi Kenkyu, 
vol. 28, No. 2, p. 15, Feb. 1952. 
       9) SatO, op. cit.,p. 23. 
     10) It is interestingto remember that Mr. T. Sato, who was in charge of the legisla-
tive section i Government at that ime, mentioned, as amatter of fact, to the dual character 
of "legality" at satake. Ibid, p. 25 f.
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and governmental side by paying a special emphasis on their logically unreason-
able logic or idea, which in turn was accomplished by the hard boiled legal posi-
tivism, etc. Let alone the legal positivistic or authoritarian view, however, it is 
certain that the terribly complexed social situation and policy in actuality at that 
time, too, proved an incentive to that logic or idea. Certain conditions urround-
ing the New Constitution may afford the key to understanding the situation. 
  The Constitution was promulgated and enforced in 1948, under theOccupa-
tion. Despite of the fact-Occupation, it is worth while to notice as epochmak-
ing that the Constitution was accomplished at least for the definite purposes, 
anti-feudalism and anti-militarism by comsparison to the Meiji Constitutiton. 
Up to that point, the Occupation power itself also played the role to help the 
direction forward for "democratization" immanent in the New Constitution. 
For instance, the reform or modernization of the half-feudalistic land-lord re-
lationships, the premodern labor relationships, and the family system mainly 
dominated by the principle of "paterfamilias" are the bypoducts of the Occupa-
tion in this role' I>. Viewed in this light, it must be called a too much narrow 
minded nationalism to condemn the Occupation Powers merely by the fact of the 
"Occupation". It must be, however, equally a questionable attitude which mere-
ly made an effort to justify every given legal means as valid and constitutional, 
regardless of circumstances, whenever those were required by the Authority. 
This may become much more questionable and unreasonable, when we remember 
the Occupation Powers especially in its certain type of the opinion which keenly 
concerned with the serious relation between the Urgent Imperial Order and the 
New Constitution, and which tried to give a special emphasis on the side of the 
Constitution in doing its business, in order to prevent possible contradictions 
between them.12 > In this connection, we need furthermore to notice the changing 
attitude of the Occupation Powers in its policy. One of the main Occupation 
policies was the "democratization", asfar as the former half period of the Occu-
pation was concerned. While the mass movement came to be more and more 
escalated along this line of policy, the Occupation Powers turned to the direc-
tion to supress the movement with fear of its coming too much active or agressive, 
particularly during the latter half period of the Occupation. 13 > Certain part of 
     11) Masayasu Hasegawa, Constitutional history of Showa era, 1961, Iwanamishoten, 
p. 255 ff. 
     12) T. Sato, op. cit., No. 2, in: Jichi Kenkyn, vol. 28, No. 5, May, 1952, p. 4. 
     13) YOZO Watanabe, Constitution a d contemporary law, 1963, Iwanamishoten, 
p. 121.
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the Potsdam Orders was also issued and applied as means for this purpose, one 
of the typical cases of which was related to the violation of the Cabinet Order 
No. 201 concerning the prohibition of acts of dispute of public servants. At 
first glance, words like "valid", "legal", and "constitutional" may sound simple 
and clear. But, even according to our observation above, it is very obvious that 
we should carefully interprete them within their social context where they are 
often used by different campaigns for some reasons to justify or rationalize ach 
of their own ideas or opinion. 
               Howto Treat The Orders at The New Stage? 
  Such a way of thinking still remained even after the validation of the Peace 
Treaty between the U. S. and Japan in 1952, even though modified in its form 
of appearance. As an illustration, let's consider how the Potsdam Orders of this 
sort were renewed within the legal system at the new stage. During the Occupa-
tion, it appeared to Japanese that two level of legal systems were valid in Japan, 
that is, the constitutitonal system as the ordinary and the Potsdam legal system 
as the extraordinary. The Peace Treaty concluded produced an effect upon the 
end of the Occupation, which in turn was supposed to naturally lead to the end 
of the dualistic legal systems, i. e., to the monistic rule of the New Constitution. 
If so, it comes to be a great issue how to treat the Potsdam Orders in order to 
make them adapt to the Constitution, which again furnishes a battle- ground 
for much controversy between two groups of diametrically opposed opinions. 
According to the concise summary of Prof. Isao Sato, the one group of the 
opinion holding originally the Orders as unconstitutional, "argued that the 
Orders should be at once out of force, as soon as the New Constitution in its 
`supreme l gal rules' character were recovered by the Independence
, while the 
other group of the opinion, supporting the Orders, argued that those, being modi-
fied, should be maintained still after the Independence, as possible it could be. 14 )" 
It was the latter opinion to which the Government s ick and took as a matter of 
fact. Thus, the Government decided to mainly adopt a course of renewal of the 
Orders as provided by Laws No. 81. 
  It is open to serious question, however, that this course was really proper and 
to be taken. For instance, some one pointed out the fact that there was no other 
      14) Isao Sato, Problems ofconstitutional i terpretation, vol., 1, 1953, Yuhikaku, 
p. 320.
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course but this renewal of the Orders in terms of the legal techique at that time. 15 
Is it good enough to satisfy us? To make an exchange of the Potsdam Orders 
for new group of laws, each of those new laws to come is surely to comply with 
the New Constitution. But there was a series of the Potsdam Orders, such as 
like the Order concerning to control social groups, etc., or the Order concerning 
the reserve police, which were strongly supected of their unconstitutionality. 
Despite of this fact, the Government dared to make an exchange of the most 
Orders for new laws. If this is true, the governmental attitude may well be called 
the hard boiled legal positivism based on the bureaucratic authoritarianism. 
At this point, Prof. Masamichi Royama's remarks are very suggestive, for he 
wrote that "the worse traditional view of the authoritarian legislation since Meiji 
era still remains in this governmental attitude, such as like ` everything is justified, 
only if it is enacted into laws. 16 P " 
  The similar trend of the attitude may be also observed in the judicial judg-
ments at that time which is particularly symbolized by the case concerning the 
violation of the Cabinet Order No. 325. Originally, this Order was to punish 
acts violating an aim of the Directive issued by the Supreme Commander to 
Japanese Government, but the vague statement, "acts violating an aim of the 
Directive-" raised from the first step a basic question whether it did violate the 
principle of "Nulla poena sine lege". Since the Peace Treaty was in full force, 
this Order came to be abolished by laws, there still remains, however, a problem 
how to treat cases which were still pending in court on the ground of violation 
of the Order above. How District Courts or High Courts were troubled very 
much by this new type of problem may be clearly shown by taking brief glimpses 
at how their judicial judgments were divided into extraordinally different direc-
tions, that is, guilty or nonguilty or acquittal- This is "menso" in Japanese 
language which is not identified with nonguilty, but peculiar to Japanese criminal 
procedure-. As a matter of fact, this troublesome business was law-technically 
resolved by means of acquittal by the Supreme Court's Judgment in 1953.17>. 
What is worth while to notice here, however, is judge's chaging attitude in our 
changing society. Figuratively speaking, we may perhaps find with great interest 
a group of judges whose attitude, while having observed the Orders under the 
     15) See Messeurs T. Sato's and Toshiyoshi M yazawa's opinions expressedin the 
round table discussion  "Where are you going, Potsdam Order?", Jurist, No. 1, Jan. 1951. 
     16) Masamichi Royama, Problem as to how to change Cabinet Order at thenew 
stage, Horitsujiho, vol. 24, No. 2, Feb. 1952, p.2. 
     17) Judgment of Supreme Court, July 22, 1953. A Collection ofCriminal Supreme 
Court Cases, vol. 7, No. 7, p. 1562 ff.
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Occupation due to the Authorities, turns to severely criticize them soon after 
the end of the Occupation. Isn't this a proper, though exteme in its character, 
case to measure and judge our judicial officers' sense to the Authority, which in 
the instnces above seems to lead to the opportunistic authoritarianism. 10 To 
clarify the contrast, we shall refer to the case in Germany soon after the end 
of the Second World War. 
                Some Comparison to The German Case 
  In 1945, German people was faced with the urgent ask to reestablish the 
democratic state ruled by the law (socalled "Rechtsstaat"). This is the quite 
similar situation to ours. Only the difference isthat a search and condemnation 
for people who helped and assisted the Nazi regime in its rise of power were 
much more consequent and severe in Germany than in Japan. This is especially 
true in regard to the Trial of the Minor War Criminals of the cooperaters, not 
but for the Major such as like in Nuremberg and Tokyo Trial. In order to do it 
legally, however, there must be some legal rules and their justification or rationali-
zation-"legalism" according to Prof. Judith Shklar191. The Occupation Au-
thorities in the areas occupied by Great Britain, Soviet Union, and France wanted 
to apply the Law of the Controlling Committee (Kontrollratsgesetz) No. 10 for 
this purpose to punish the Minor of the cooperaters. The Law No. 10 was enacted 
by that Committee after the end of the Nazi regime, in 1945. Conversly, coope-
rative acts of those people had been done during the Nazi period, that is, before 
1945, or at latest before May, 1945. Here is a simple gap between the time when 
acts were actually done and the time when the Law was enacted to punish them. 
But this is really a great gap in terms of the criminal aw. As it's well known, 
the princiles of "Nulla poena sine lege", "Nullum crimen sine lege" include the 
prohibition of "ex post facto law", i.e., the doctrine appealing, "Do not apply 
the retroactive rules of the criminal law to the acts which were done before this 
retroactive l gislation is enacted." Doesn't he application of the Law of Con-
trolling Committee No. 10 violate the prohibiton above? The Occupation Au-
thorities in those areas tried to make German courts apply them for those cases. 
As a matter of course, it invited German lawyer's incisive criticism. One of the 
most leading criticism was offered by Hodo Fr. von Hodenberg, President of 
     18) See Ryuichi Hirano, On the judicial judgment concerning the Cabinet Order
No. 325, Horitsujiho, vol. 24, No. 8, Aug. 1952, p.38. 
     19) Judith Shklar, Legalism, 1964, p. 151 ff.
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Higher Court (Oberlandesgericht), Celle. His paper, very influencial both in 
legal theory and practice, aimed at to clarify the issue as to how the Law No. 10 
was not to be applied in terms of the principle, "Nulla poena sine lege20 I." 
  But, what is much more worthy of attention here is that his argument was 
drawn from his very tough and strong state of mind which tended to criticize 
thoroughly everything whenever it does not comply with the juristic logic, what-
ever it may be a program of the Occupation Authority. This may perhaps come 
from the German attitude, if I could generalize in this way, to search systema-
tically for subjects in terms of logical consequency. It is also not a little remar-
kable to note that such a type of attitude was not only found in the side of people 
against he application, but in the side of people, such as late Prof. Gustav 
Radbruch21 > in defending the application of the Law No. 10, so that the similarly 
backboned attitudes led to the much more heated controversy on it. By the 
way, it reminds us a remarkable contrast between German and Japanese lawyers 
or legally educated people. As mentioned above, some of Japanese lawyers, 
or legally educated politician were haunted with their opportunistic weakness 
under the Occupation which may well be symbolized by the premodern, (or 
supra-) authoritarian attitude. To speak of the problem of the war crime must 
have been somewhat the unpleasant matter for German people, too, but it has 
still continued in the form of the war criminal trial, and yet it has not been cancel-
led by means of the prescription, application of which was given up after the 
discussion there in the event of 20 years after the end of the Nazi regime. How 
about the situation in Japan22 >? It must, I think, be illustrated by the saying, 
"Ichi oku so zange" (One hundred million of Japanese are to be responsible 
and regretful for their war). This saying seems to be very tricky, because to say 
all Japanese being responsible isto discharge them by generalizing a responsibi-
lity within a vague context and splitting it. Under such a state of feeling, the 
problem of the war criminal has been almost forgotten in Japan, as it well be 
said "Out of sight, out of mind". It does not follow from the said above, how-
     20) Hodo Fr. von Hodenberg, Zur Anwendung des Kontrollratsgesetzes Nr. 10
durch deutsche G richte, Si ddeutsche Juristenzeitung, 1947, S. 113 ff. Yasaki, Legal Posi-
tivism, (publ. by Nihonhyoronshinsha) p. 73 ff. 
     21) Gustav Radbruch, Zur Diskussion fiber die Verbrechen gegen die Menschlich-
keit, Siiddeutsche Juristenzeitung,1947, S. 133ff. Yasaki, op. cit., p. 76, 97. 
     22) As to the contrast between Japanese and German peopleinregard to this pro-
blem, see Shklar, op. cit., p. 111 ff. Edwin 0. Reischauer, The United States and Japan, 3rd 
ed., 1965, translated into Japanese by N. Hayashi, p.251 ff. Keiichi Sakuta, Responsibility 
for war crime and wish to peace, in: Asahi Newspaper, Aug. 11, 1965.
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ever, that I agree with the procedure of the war criminal trial taken after 1945, 
here and there. It involves o many difficulties, as shown by critical studies. 
But, what I am aiming at here is to analyze some socio-cultural conditions under-
lying the authoritarian and the hard boiled legal positivism in Japan, by contrast 
to the German. By means of scheme of "sin-culture" and "shame-culture", 
Miss Ruth Benedict once pointed out the sharp contrast between cultures in the 
West and Japan .23 ) Perhaps, Japanese state of mind, that is, the shameculture 
to some extent, as very much concerned with condemnation by others from the 
outside, not but with their own coscience or consciencious criticism to themselves 
may afford the key to understanding why Japanese, despite of their moderniza-
tion in their appearance, are tended to obey the Authority and its laws, that is, 
our major subject. 
     23) Ruth Benedict, The chrysanthemum and the sword, 1946.
